I found this article from Atlantic fascinating. Highly speculative, to be sure, but tackling the delicate issue of religion in a such a plausibly secular way as to be intriguing despite the obvious gaps.
I’d summarize the essential argument as follows.
1. During development, children learn to apply psychological properties to objects, which are distinct from physical properties.
2. Children begin to exhibit a belief in dualism, meaning that children believe that psychological properties of objects are causally separate from the physical properties of the object.
3. Sociological forces then capitalize on this baseline supernatural belief to organize communities of religious beliefs.
Of course, what is missing is any functional theory of how psychological and subsequent supernatural belief systems actually arise. Such a mechanism seems beyond the scope of psychological inquiry at the current time, so non-atheists are free to believe that such faculties arise precisely because a supernatural world exists, and without such faculties we’d be just a bunch of sub-sentient apes.
I’m confident science will progress to the point where the importance of such debates will begin to fade. As an agnostic, I’m free to speculate either way, and I think the more interesting ideas arise from assuming that no such supernatural world exists (“what you see is what you get” school of phenomenology).
[Aside: Anastasia posed the interesting question. What if such a theory exists concerning the scientific origins of supernatural thinking and we are incapable of understanding it? Or what if past a certain point, self-knowledge is impossible? I'm going to be an optimist and assume it is possible. However, consider Dawkins observation that "it is almost as if the human brain were specifically designed to misunderstand Darwinism."]
Without a supernatural world, the development of dualism in the cognitive development of children can either be a sort of spurious byproduct of some useful evolutionary trait, or perhaps an essential advantageous trait in its own right. [Religions do have some useful properties: they provide rules of ethics that are typically beneficial to a societies continued dominance. I consider culture in general to be a vehicle for Lamarckian evolution, which isn't a scientific claim, but simply a human one.] But how might this essential divide in how children treat psychological and physical properties arise?
To my mind, the key difference is predictability. A living thing is considerably more dynamic than something purely physical. As we know from Piaget, learning the constancy of certain physical properties does not fully develop in children until ages 5-7. Psychological properties seem entirely less predictable than physical properties. To my mind, they seem harder to learn (do we ever see the reverse of austism?) and are perhaps defined precisely by their apparent non-determinism.
So is apparent non-determinism the property that necessitates cognitive dualism? I’m not sure, but I think simply trying to find methods that identify the difference between physical objects and psychological objects in the environment is a tractable problem, and would fit into current research being done in developmental robotics. I’ll call it developmental social robotics.