The Logic of Scientific Discovery

by JS

At the beginning of the summer, I always plan on reading all the things I did not quite get to during other seasons of the year. Though I am often too ambitious, I am making some progress on a number of fronts. The first is Karl Popper’s landmark The Logic of Scientific Discovery. As I read through Popper’s ideas on the logic of science I am struck by how pervasive his ideas have become among the scientific establishment. No, that’s not quite right, his ideas are a pervasive part of our cultural view, not the establishment, of science. I’m not sure if Popper was the first to formulate falsifiability as a rigorous philosophical criterion demarcating scientific hypotheses, but reading his clear exposition of the concept certainly makes his ideas ring true.

I will note that one question Popper does not seem to consider is: “What makes a particular scientific pursuit interesting?” I’ve been struggling with this question in my own research, as I sift through a number of silos of work in machine learning and robotics, looking for both the big picture and the motivations behind each community effort. I do think it is possible to pose scientific questions that meet all the criteria of demarcation that Popper spells out, which fail as scientific questions simply because nobody else cares. Indeed, I think such “trivial” science actually comprises the near totality of posable scientific hypotheses. We don’t notice this because of a combination of our own bias and the natural selection bias that any peer reviewed scientific community uses as an organizing social and meritocratic engine.